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Paper 2012/702

Cryptanalysis of RAPP, an RFID Authentication Protocol

Nasour Bagheri, Masoumeh Safkhani, Pedro Peris-Lopez, Juan E. Tapiador

Abstract

Tian et al. proposed a novel ultralightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol [4] that has recently been analyzed in [1], [2], [5]. In this letter, we first propose a desynchronization attack that succeeds with probability almost 1, which improves upon the 0.25 given by the attack in [1]. We also show that the bad properties of the proposed permutation function can be exploited to disclose several bits of the tag’s secret (rather than just one bit as in [2]), which increases the power of a traceability attack. Finally, we show how to extend the above attack to run a full disclosure attack, which requires to eavesdrop less protocol runs than the attack described in [5] (i.e., 192 << 230).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
RFIDAuthenticationAttacks
Contact author(s)
na bagheri @ gmail com
History
2012-12-18: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/702
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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