Paper 2012/702
Cryptanalysis of RAPP, an RFID Authentication Protocol
Nasour Bagheri, Masoumeh Safkhani, Pedro Peris-Lopez, and Juan E. Tapiador
Abstract
Tian et al. proposed a novel ultralightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol [4] that has recently been analyzed in [1], [2], [5]. In this letter, we first propose a desynchronization attack that succeeds with probability almost 1, which improves upon the 0.25 given by the attack in [1]. We also show that the bad properties of the proposed permutation function can be exploited to disclose several bits of the tag’s secret (rather than just one bit as in [2]), which increases the power of a traceability attack. Finally, we show how to extend the above attack to run a full disclosure attack, which requires to eavesdrop less protocol runs than the attack described in [5] (i.e., 192 << 230).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- RFIDAuthenticationAttacks
- Contact author(s)
- na bagheri @ gmail com
- History
- 2012-12-18: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/702
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/702,
author = {Nasour Bagheri and Masoumeh Safkhani and Pedro Peris-Lopez and Juan E. Tapiador},
title = {Cryptanalysis of {RAPP}, an {RFID} Authentication Protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/702},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/702}
}
