Paper 2012/690
The Weakness of Integrity Protection for LTE
Teng Wu and Guang Gong
Abstract
In this paper, we concentrate on the security issues of the integrity protection of LTE and present two different forgery attacks. For the first attack, referred to as a {\em linear forgery attack}, EIA1 and EIA3, two integrity protection algorithms of LTE, are insecure if the initial value (IV) can be repeated twice during the life cycle of an integrity key (IK). Because of the linearity of EIA1 and EIA3, given two valid Message Authentication Codes (MACs) our algorithm can forge up to
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. this is the full version of the paper submitted to WiSec'13
- Keywords
- ForgeryMACLTEman-in-the-middle
- Contact author(s)
- teng wu @ uwaterloo ca
- History
- 2012-12-11: revised
- 2012-12-10: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/690
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/690, author = {Teng Wu and Guang Gong}, title = {The Weakness of Integrity Protection for {LTE}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/690}, year = {2012}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/690} }