Paper 2012/672
Collision Attacks on Up to 5 Rounds of SHA-3 Using Generalized Internal Differentials
Itai Dinur, Orr Dunkelman, and Adi Shamir
Abstract
On October 2-nd 2012 NIST announced its selection of the Keccak scheme as the new SHA-3 hash standard. In this paper we present the first published collision finding attacks on reduced-round versions of Keccak-384 and Keccak-512, providing actual collisions for 3-round versions, and describing an attack which is $2^{45}$ times faster than birthday attacks for 4-round Keccak-384. For Keccak-256, we increase the number of rounds which can be attacked to 5. All these results are based on a generalized {\it internal differential attack} (introduced by Peyrin at Crypto 2010), and use it to map a large number of Keccak inputs into a relatively small subset of possible outputs with a surprisingly large probability. In such a \textit{squeeze attack} it is easier to find random collisions in the reduced target subset by a standard birthday argument.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Full version of the FSE 2013 paper
- Keywords
- Hash functioncryptanalysisSHA-3Keccakcollisionsinternal differentialssqueeze attack.
- Contact author(s)
- itai dinur @ weizmann ac il
- History
- 2013-02-12: revised
- 2012-11-28: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/672
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/672,
author = {Itai Dinur and Orr Dunkelman and Adi Shamir},
title = {Collision Attacks on Up to 5 Rounds of {SHA}-3 Using Generalized Internal Differentials},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/672},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/672}
}
