Biclique Cryptanalysis Of PRESENT, LED, And KLEIN

Farzaneh Abed; Christian Forler; Eik List; Stefan Lucks; Jakob Wenzel

Paper 2012/591

Biclique Cryptanalysis Of PRESENT, LED, And KLEIN

Farzaneh Abed, Christian Forler, Eik List, Stefan Lucks, and Jakob Wenzel

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the resistance of the lightweight ciphers PRESENT, LED, and KLEIN to biclique attacks. Primarily, we describe attacks on the full-round versions PRESENT-80, PRESENT-128, LED-64, LED-128, KLEIN-80, and KLEIN-96. Our attacks have time complexities of $2^{79.49}$ , $2^{127.32}$ , $2^{63.58}$ , $2^{127.42}$ , $2^{79.00}$ , and $2^{95.18}$ encryptions, respectively. In addition, we consider attacks on round-reduced versions of PRESENT and LED, to show the security margin for which an adversary can obtain an advantage of at least a factor of two compared to exhaustive search.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: PRESENT LED lightweight block cipher independent biclique matching with precomputations
Contact author(s): eik list @ uni-weimar de
History: 2013-05-27: last of 2 revisions; 2012-10-25: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2012/591
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/591,
      author = {Farzaneh Abed and Christian Forler and Eik List and Stefan Lucks and Jakob Wenzel},
      title = {Biclique Cryptanalysis Of {PRESENT}, {LED}, And {KLEIN}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/591},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/591}
}