Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/591

Biclique Cryptanalysis Of PRESENT, LED, And KLEIN

Farzaneh Abed and Christian Forler and Eik List and Stefan Lucks and Jakob Wenzel

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the resistance of the lightweight ciphers PRESENT, LED, and KLEIN to biclique attacks. Primarily, we describe attacks on the full-round versions PRESENT-80, PRESENT-128, LED-64, LED-128, KLEIN-80, and KLEIN-96. Our attacks have time complexities of $2^{79.49}$, $2^{127.32}$, $2^{63.58}$, $2^{127.42}$, $2^{79.00}$, and $2^{95.18}$ encryptions, respectively. In addition, we consider attacks on round-reduced versions of PRESENT and LED, to show the security margin for which an adversary can obtain an advantage of at least a factor of two compared to exhaustive search.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / PRESENT, LED, lightweight block cipher, independent biclique, matching with precomputations

Date: received 18 Oct 2012, last revised 27 May 2013

Contact author: eik list at uni-weimar de

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20130527:202854 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2012/591

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