Paper 2012/580

Cryptanalysis of the OKH Authenticated Encryption Scheme

Peng Wang, Wenling Wu, and Liting Zhang

Abstract

Alomair proposed a new authenticated encryption scheme OKH at ACNS 2012, and proved the security, i.e. authenticity and privacy, of OKH. Our research shows that it is not the case. We only need one query to break the authenticity of OKH with success probability of $1$, and two queries to break the privacy of OKH with success probability of $1-1/2^n$, where $n$ is the block-length of underlying blockcipher.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Authenticated Encryption
Contact author(s)
wp @ is ac cn
History
2012-11-29: revised
2012-10-16: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/580
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/580,
      author = {Peng Wang and Wenling Wu and Liting Zhang},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of the OKH Authenticated Encryption Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/580},
      year = {2012},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/580}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/580}
}
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