Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/512

Constant-Overhead Secure Computation of Boolean Circuits using Preprocessing

Ivan Damgard and Sarah Zakarias

Abstract: We present a protocol for securely computing a Boolean circuit $C$ in presence of a dishonest and malicious majority. The protocol is unconditionally secure, assuming access to a preprocessing functionality that is not given the inputs to compute on. For a large number of players the work done by each player is the same as the work needed to compute the circuit in the clear, up to a constant factor. Our protocol is the first to obtain these properties for Boolean circuits. On the technical side, we develop new homomorphic authentication schemes based on asymptotically good codes with an additional multiplication property. We also show a new algorithm for verifying the product of Boolean matrices in quadratic time with exponentially small error probability, where previous methods would only give a constant error.

Category / Keywords: protocols, authentication, secure computation

Date: received 3 Sep 2012, last revised 1 Mar 2013

Contact author: ivan at cs au dk, szakarias@gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Added sketch of how preprocessing can be done based on protocol from [DPSZ12]

Version: 20130301:231359 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2012/512

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