Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/426
A Generalised Formula for Calculating the Resilience of Random Key Predistribution Schemes
Ed Kendall and Michelle Kendall and Wilfrid S. Kendall
Abstract: A commonly used metric for comparing the resilience of key predistribution schemes is $\fail_s$, which measures the proportion of network connections which are `broken' by an adversary which has compromised $s$ nodes. In `Random key predistribution schemes for sensor networks', Chan, Perrig and Song present a formula for measuring the resilience in a class of random key predistribution schemes called $q$-composite schemes. We present a correction to this formula for schemes where more than one key may be used to secure a link between a pair of nodes. Our corrected formula features an additional parameter which makes it applicable to a wider variety of random key predistribution schemes, including the original Eschenauer Gligor scheme. We also present a simplification of the formula for calculating connectivity.
We refer to the recent paper by Yum and Lee which also claims to correct the original formula for the $q$-composite scheme. However the resulting formula is complicated, computationally demanding, and hard to understand. The formula which we propose and prove is easily computable and can be applied to a wider range of schemes.
Category / Keywords: applications / key predistribution schemes, wireless sensor networks
Date: received 27 Jul 2012
Contact author: michelle louise kendall at gmail com
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Version: 20120805:141930 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2012/426
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