A Publicly-Veriable Mix-net with Everlasting Privacy Towards Observers

Denise Demirel; Jeroen van de Graaf

Paper 2012/420

A Publicly-Veriable Mix-net with Everlasting Privacy Towards Observers

Denise Demirel and Jeroen van de Graaf

Abstract

In this paper we present a novel, publicly verifiable mixing scheme which has everlasting privacy towards observers: all the information published on the bulletin board by the mixes (audit information etc) reveals no information about the identity of any of the messages published. The correctness of the mixing process is statistical: even if all authorities conspire, they cannot change the contents of any message without being detected with overwhelming probability. We accomplish this by encoding the messages submitted using so-called Pedersen commitments. Decoding (opening) these is possible because we create a parallel mix-net run by the same mixes to which the public has no access. This private mix-net uses the same permutations as the public one, but uses homomorphic encryption, which is used to send auxiliary information (messages, decommitment values) through the mix-net to allow decoding.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: Mix-net Verifiability Information-Theoretic Privacy eVoting
Contact author(s): denise demirel @ cased de
History: 2012-08-02: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2012/420
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/420,
      author = {Denise Demirel and Jeroen van de Graaf},
      title = {A Publicly-Veriable Mix-net with Everlasting Privacy Towards Observers},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/420},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/420}
}