Paper 2012/410

Cryptanalysis of an Identity-Based Multiple Key Agreement Scheme

Qingfeng Cheng

Abstract

Multiple key agreement (MKA) protocols allow two parties to generate two or more session keys in one session, which will be used for future secure communications in public network. In recent years, many MKA protocols have been proposed. However, most of them do not consider ephemeral key compromise resilience, and some of them still exists security flaws. In this paper, we analyze the scheme proposed by Dehkordi and Alimoradi in 2011, which is announced with stronger security. We will present ephemeral key compromise attack and impersonation attack against Dehkordi and Alimoradi’s protocol. For overcoming these security flaws, we also propose an improvement of Dehkordi and Alimoradi’s protocol.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
multiple key agreementbilinear pairingmutual authenticationephemeral key compromise attackimpersonation attack
Contact author(s)
qingfengc2008 @ sina com
History
2012-07-25: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/410
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/410,
      author = {Qingfeng Cheng},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of an Identity-Based Multiple Key Agreement Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/410},
      year = {2012},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/410}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/410}
}
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