Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/410

Cryptanalysis of an Identity-Based Multiple Key Agreement Scheme

Qingfeng Cheng

Abstract: Multiple key agreement (MKA) protocols allow two parties to generate two or more session keys in one session, which will be used for future secure communications in public network. In recent years, many MKA protocols have been proposed. However, most of them do not consider ephemeral key compromise resilience, and some of them still exists security flaws. In this paper, we analyze the scheme proposed by Dehkordi and Alimoradi in 2011, which is announced with stronger security. We will present ephemeral key compromise attack and impersonation attack against Dehkordi and Alimoradi’s protocol. For overcoming these security flaws, we also propose an improvement of Dehkordi and Alimoradi’s protocol.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / multiple key agreement, bilinear pairing, mutual authentication, ephemeral key compromise attack, impersonation attack

Date: received 23 Jul 2012

Contact author: qingfengc2008 at sina com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20120725:191320 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2012/410

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