Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/381

A Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol from Bilinear Groups without Random Oracles

Zheng Yang

Abstract: Since the introducing of extended Canetti-Krawczyk~(eCK) security model for two party key exchange, many protocols have been proposed to provide eCK security. However, most of those protocols are provably secure in the random oracle model or rely on special design technique well-known as the NAXOS trick. In contrast to previous schemes, we present an eCK secure protocol in the standard model, without NAXOS trick and without knowledge of secret key (KOSK) assumption for public key registration. The security proof of our scheme is based on standard pairing assumption, collision resistant hash functions, Bilinear Decision Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) and Decision Linear Diffie-Hellman (DLIN) assumptions, and pseudo-random functions with pairwise independent random source. Although our proposed protocol is based on bilinear groups, it doesn't need any pairing operations during protocol execution.

Category / Keywords: one-round authenticated key exchange, pairing, insider security, standard model

Publication Info: -

Date: received 7 Jul 2012, last revised 30 May 2013, withdrawn 22 Jul 2013

Contact author: zheng yang at rub de

Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --)

Version: 20130722:091630 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2012/381

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