Paper 2012/381

A Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol from Bilinear Groups without Random Oracles

Zheng Yang

Abstract

Since the introducing of extended Canetti-Krawczyk~(eCK) security model for two party key exchange, many protocols have been proposed to provide eCK security. However, most of those protocols are provably secure in the random oracle model or rely on special design technique well-known as the NAXOS trick. In contrast to previous schemes, we present an eCK secure protocol in the standard model, without NAXOS trick and without knowledge of secret key (KOSK) assumption for public key registration. The security proof of our scheme is based on standard pairing assumption, collision resistant hash functions, Bilinear Decision Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) and Decision Linear Diffie-Hellman (DLIN) assumptions, and pseudo-random functions with pairwise independent random source. Although our proposed protocol is based on bilinear groups, it doesn't need any pairing operations during protocol execution.

Metadata
Available format(s)
-- withdrawn --
Publication info
Published elsewhere. -
Keywords
one-round authenticated key exchangepairinginsider securitystandard model
Contact author(s)
zheng yang @ rub de
History
2013-07-22: withdrawn
2012-07-11: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/381
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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