Paper 2012/380

Several Weak Bit-Commitments Using Seal-Once Tamper-Evident Devices

Ioana Boureanu and Serge Vaudenay

Abstract

Following both theoretical and practical arguments, we construct UC-secure bit-commitment protocols that place their strength on the sender’s side and are built using tamper-evident devices, e.g., a type of distinguishable, sealed envelopes. We show that by using a second formalisation of tamper-evident distinguishable envelopes we can attain better security guarantees, i.e., EUC-security. We show the relations between several flavours of weak bit-commitments, bit-commitments and distinguishable tamper-evident envelopes. We focus, at all points, on the lightweight nature of the underlying mechanisms and on the end-to-end human verifiability.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. A shorter version of this paper appeared in the proceedings of ProvSec'12, LNCS, Springer
Keywords
UC frameworkbit-commitmenttamper-evidence
Contact author(s)
ioana boureanu @ epfl ch
History
2012-09-11: revised
2012-07-06: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/380
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/380,
      author = {Ioana Boureanu and Serge Vaudenay},
      title = {Several Weak Bit-Commitments Using Seal-Once Tamper-Evident Devices},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/380},
      year = {2012},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/380}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/380}
}
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