Paper 2012/366
Securing Circuits Against Constant-Rate Tampering
Dana Dachman-Soled and Yael Tauman Kalai
Abstract
We present a compiler that converts any circuit into one that remains secure even if a constant fraction of its wires are tampered with. Following the seminal work of Ishai et al. (Eurocrypt 2006), we consider adversaries who may choose an arbitrary set of wires to corrupt, and may set each such wire to 0 or to 1, or may toggle with the wire. We prove that such adversaries, who continuously tamper with the circuit, can learn at most logarithmically many bits of secret information (in addition to black-box access to the circuit). Our results are information theoretic.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Crypto 2012
- Keywords
- side-channel attackstamperingcircuit compilerPCP of proximity
- Contact author(s)
- dadachma @ microsoft com
- History
- 2012-06-29: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/366
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/366,
author = {Dana Dachman-Soled and Yael Tauman Kalai},
title = {Securing Circuits Against Constant-Rate Tampering},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/366},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/366}
}
