RSA modulus generation in the two-party case

Gerald Gavin

Paper 2012/336

RSA modulus generation in the two-party case

Gerald Gavin

Abstract

In this paper, secure two-party protocols are provided in order to securely generate a random $k$ -bit RSA modulus $n$ keeping its factorization secret. We first show that most existing two-party protocols based on Boneh's test are not correct: an RSA modulus can be output in the malicious case. Recently, Hazay et al. proposed the first proven secure protocol against any polynomial active adversary. However, their protocol is very costly: several hours are required to output a 1024-bit RSA modulus on a standard platform. In this paper, we propose an other approach consisting of post-processing efficient existing Boneh's based protocols. The running time of this post-processing can be neglected with respect to the running time of the whole protocol.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. accepted in the industrial track of ACNS'12 (without proceedings)
Keywords: RSA modulus Boneh's test keys share
Contact author(s): gavin @ univ-lyon1 fr
History: 2012-06-22: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2012/336
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/336,
      author = {Gerald Gavin},
      title = {{RSA} modulus generation in the two-party case},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/336},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/336}
}