Paper 2012/336
RSA modulus generation in the two-party case
Gerald Gavin
Abstract
In this paper, secure two-party protocols are provided in order to securely generate a random $k$-bit RSA modulus $n$ keeping its factorization secret. We first show that most existing two-party protocols based on Boneh's test are not correct: an RSA modulus can be output in the malicious case. Recently, Hazay et al. proposed the first proven secure protocol against any polynomial active adversary. However, their protocol is very costly: several hours are required to output a 1024-bit RSA modulus on a standard platform. In this paper, we propose an other approach consisting of post-processing efficient existing Boneh's based protocols. The running time of this post-processing can be neglected with respect to the running time of the whole protocol.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. accepted in the industrial track of ACNS'12 (without proceedings)
- Keywords
- RSA modulusBoneh's testkeys share
- Contact author(s)
- gavin @ univ-lyon1 fr
- History
- 2012-06-22: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/336
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/336,
author = {Gerald Gavin},
title = {{RSA} modulus generation in the two-party case},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/336},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/336}
}
