Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/316

Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker in Action

Gergei Bana and Pedro Adão and Hideki Sakurada

Abstract: In this paper we show that the recent technique of computationally complete symbolic attackers proposed by Bana and Comon-Lundh for computationally sound verification is powerful enough to verify actual protocols, such as the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol. In their model, one does not define explicit Dolev-Yao adversarial capabilities but rather the limitations of the adversarial capabilities. In this paper we present a set of axioms sufficient to show that no symbolic adversary compliant with these axioms can successfully violate secrecy or authentication in case of the NSL protocol. Hence all implementations for which these axioms are sound – namely, implementations using CCA2 encryption, and satisfying a minimal parsing requirement for pairing – exclude the possibility of successful computational attacks.

Category / Keywords: foundations / symbolic verification, computational soundness

Date: received 4 Jun 2012, last revised 29 Oct 2012

Contact author: bana at math upenn edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Simplified the soundness proofs and changed the title

Version: 20121029:161901 (All versions of this report)

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