Paper 2012/312
Cryptanalysis of a Provably Secure Gateway-Oriented Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol
Debiao He
Abstract
Recently, Chien et al. proposed a gateway-oriented password-based authenticated key exchange (GPAKE) protocol, through which a client and a gateway could generate a session key for future communication with the help of an authentication server. They also demonstrated that their scheme is provably secure in a formal model. However, in this letter, we will show that Chien et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack. To overcome the weakness, we also propose an efficient countermeasure.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. The paper has not been published.
- Keywords
- Password-basedAuthenticated key exchangeGatewayOff-line password guessing attack
- Contact author(s)
- hedebiao @ 163 com
- History
- 2012-06-03: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/312
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/312,
author = {Debiao He},
title = {Cryptanalysis of a Provably Secure Gateway-Oriented Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/312},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/312}
}
