Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/308
Verified Security of Redundancy-Free Encryption from Rabin and RSA
Gilles Barthe and David Pointcheval and Santiago Zanella-Béguelin
Abstract: Verified security provides a firm foundation for cryptographic proofs
by means of rigorous programming language techniques and verification
methods. EasyCrypt is a framework that realizes the verified security
paradigm and supports the machine-checked construction and
verification of cryptographic proofs using state-of-the-art SMT
solvers, automated theorem provers and interactive proof assistants.
Previous experiments have shown that EasyCrypt is effective for a
posteriori validation of cryptographic systems. In this paper, we
report on the first application of verified security to a novel
cryptographic construction, with strong security properties and
interesting practical features. Specifically, we use EasyCrypt to
prove the IND-CCA security of a redundancy-free public-key encryption
scheme based on trapdoor one-way permutations. Somewhat surprisingly,
we show that even with a zero-length redundancy, Boneh's SAEP scheme
(an OAEP-like construction with a single-round Feistel network rather
than two) converts a trapdoor one-way permutation into an
IND-CCA-secure scheme, provided the permutation satisfies two
additional properties. We then prove that the Rabin function and RSA
with short exponent enjoy these properties, and thus can be used to
instantiate the construction we propose to obtain efficient encryption
schemes. The reduction that justifies the security of our construction
is tight enough to achieve practical security with reasonable key
sizes.
Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Public-key encryption, provable security, machine-checked proofs, OAEP, SAEP, ZAEP
Publication Info: To appear in 19th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2012. ACM Press, 2012.
Date: received 31 May 2012, last revised 6 Aug 2012
Contact author: santiago at microsoft com
Available formats: PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: Added publication information.
Version: 20120806:140616 (All versions of this report)
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