Paper 2012/189

Universally Composable Key-Management

Steve Kremer, Robert Künnemann, and Graham Steel

Abstract

We present the first universally composable key-management functionality, formalized in the GNUC framework by Hofheinz and Shoup. It allows the enforcement of a wide range of security policies and can be extended by diverse key usage operations with no need to repeat the security proof. We illustrate its use by proving an implementation of a security token secure with respect to arbitrary key-usage operations and explore a proof technique that allows the storage of cryptographic keys externally, a novel development in simulation-based security frameworks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. (not yet published)
Contact author(s)
kunneman @ lsv ens-cachan fr
History
2013-04-11: last of 2 revisions
2012-04-11: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/189
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/189,
      author = {Steve Kremer and Robert Künnemann and Graham Steel},
      title = {Universally Composable Key-Management},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/189},
      year = {2012},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/189}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/189}
}
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