Paper 2012/102
On the Circular Security of Bit-Encryption
Ron Rothblum
Abstract
Motivated by recent developments in fully homomorphic encryption, we consider the folklore conjecture that every semantically-secure bit-encryption scheme is circular secure, or in other words, that every bit-encryption scheme remains secure even when the adversary is given encryptions of the individual bits of the private-key. We show the following obstacles to proving this conjecture:
1. We construct a public-key bit-encryption scheme that is plausibly semantically secure, but is not circular secure. The circular security attack manages to fully recover the private-key. The construction is based on an extension of the Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman assumption (SXDH) from bilinear groups, to
Note: Fixed a typo
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Circular SecurityKDM
- Contact author(s)
- ron rothblum @ weizmann ac il
- History
- 2012-03-07: revised
- 2012-02-29: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/102
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/102, author = {Ron Rothblum}, title = {On the Circular Security of Bit-Encryption}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/102}, year = {2012}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/102} }