Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/100

Cryptanalysis of a Universally Verifiable Efficient Re-encryption Mixnet

Shahram Khazaei and Björn Terelius and Douglas Wikström

Abstract: We study the heuristically secure mix-net proposed by Puiggalí and Guasch (EVOTE 2010). We present practical attacks on both correctness and privacy for some sets of parameters of the scheme. Although our attacks only allow us to replace a few inputs, or to break the privacy of a few voters, this shows that the scheme can not be proven secure.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / electronic elections, mix-net

Date: received 24 Feb 2012

Contact author: dog at csc kth se

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20120229:131710 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2012/100

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion