Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/090

Worst-Case to Average-Case Reductions for Module Lattices

Adeline Langlois and Damien Stehle

Abstract: Most lattice-based cryptographic schemes are built upon the assumed hardness of the Short Integer Solution (SIS) and Learning With Errors (LWE) problems. Their efficiencies can be drastically improved by switching the hardness assumptions to the more compact Ring-SIS and Ring-LWE problems. However, this change of hardness assumptions comes along with a possible security weakening: SIS and LWE are known to be at least as hard as standard (worst-case) problems on euclidean lattices, whereas Ring-SIS and Ring-LWE are only known to be as hard as their restrictions to special classes of ideal lattices, corresponding to ideals of some polynomial rings. In this work, we define the Module-SIS and Module-LWE problems, which bridge SIS with Ring-SIS, and LWE with Ring-LWE, respectively. We prove that these average-case problems are at least as hard as standard lattice problems restricted to module lattices (which themselves generalize arbitrary and ideal lattices). As these new problems enlarge the toolbox of the lattice-based cryptographer, they could prove useful for designing new schemes. Importantly, the worst-case to average-case reductions for the module problems are (qualitatively) sharp, in the sense that there exist converse reductions. This property is not known to hold in the context of Ring-SIS/Ring-LWE: Ideal lattice problems could reveal easy without impacting the hardness of Ring-SIS/Ring-LWE.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography /

Date: received 23 Feb 2012, last revised 14 Aug 2013

Contact author: damien stehle at ens-lyon fr

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Version: 20130815:054538 (All versions of this report)

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