Semi-Supervised Template Attack

Liran Lerman; Stephane Fernandes Medeiros; Nikita Veshchikov; Cedric Meuter; Gianluca Bontempi; Olivier Markowitch

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Paper 2012/082

Semi-Supervised Template Attack

Liran Lerman, Stephane Fernandes Medeiros, Nikita Veshchikov, Cedric Meuter, Gianluca Bontempi, and Olivier Markowitch

Abstract

Side channel attacks take advantage of the information leakage in a cryptographic device. A template attack is a family of side channel attacks which is reputed to be extremely effective. This kind of attacks supposes that the attacker can fully control a cryptographic device before attacking a similar one. In this paper, we propose a method based on a semi-supervised learning strategy to relax this assumption. The effectiveness of our proposal is confirmed by software simulations as well as by experiments on a 8-bit microcontroller.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: Side channel attack Template attack Power analysis Machine learning Semi-supervised learning Clustering Hamming weight
Contact author(s): llerman @ ulb ac be
History: 2012-02-23: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2012/082
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/082,
      author = {Liran Lerman and Stephane Fernandes Medeiros and Nikita Veshchikov and Cedric Meuter and Gianluca Bontempi and Olivier Markowitch},
      title = {Semi-Supervised Template Attack},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/082},
      year = {2012},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/082}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/082}
}