Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/063

Randomized Partial Checking Revisited

Shahram Khazaei and Douglas Wikstr{\"o}m

Abstract: We study mix-nets with randomized partial checking (RPC) as proposed by Jakobsson, Juels, and Rivest (2002). RPC is a technique to verify the correctness of an execution both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. The idea is to relax the correctness and privacy requirements to achieve a more efficient mix-net.

We identify serious issues in the original description of mix-nets with RPC and show how to exploit these to break both correctness and privacy, both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. Our attacks are practical and applicable to real world mix-net implementations, e.g., the Civitas and the Scantegrity voting systems.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / mix-net, election schemes

Date: received 13 Feb 2012

Contact author: dog at csc kth se

Available formats: PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: If you know of additional implementations that are vulnerable, then please let us know about it.

Version: 20120214:170443 (All versions of this report)

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