- The scheme of Waters (Eurocrypt 2005), secure under the computational Diffie-Hellman asumption in bilinear groups.
- The scheme of Boneh and Boyen (Eurocrypt 2004, J. Cryptology 2008), secure under the $q$-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption in bilinear groups.
- The scheme of Gennaro, Halevi, and Rabin (Eurocrypt 1999), secure under the strong RSA assumption.
- The scheme of Hohenberger and Waters (Crypto 2009), secure under the RSA assumption.
Our systems not only allow weaker security assumptions than were previously available for homomorphic signatures in the standard model, but also are secure in a model that allows a stronger adversary than in other proposed schemes. Our framework also leads to efficient linearly homomorphic signatures that are secure against our stronger adversary under weak assumptions (CDH or RSA) in the random oracle model; all previous proofs of security in the random oracle model break down completely when faced with our stronger adversary.
Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Homomorphic signatures, standard model, bilinear groups, CDH, RSA Publication Info: Extended abstract to appear in PKC 2012 Date: received 8 Feb 2012, last revised 9 Mar 2012 Contact author: dfreeman at cs stanford edu Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Note: Revised to incorporate referee feedback. Version: 20120310:013005 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2012/060 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion