Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/031
An error in "On a new formal proof model for RFID location privacy"
Abstract: In Information Processing Letters 110 (2) (2009) 57-61, Deursen and Radomirović evaluated five formal RFID privacy models. One main result is that Ha et al.ís RFID privacy model is incorrect. The supporting fact is that a constant-response protocol cannot pass the test of Ha et al.ís RFID privacy model. However, we demonstrate that the constant-response protocol is artificial, and the corresponding result is therefore unwarranted. It means that Ha et al.ís RFID privacy model is not a trivial model. Hence, more effort still can be made to improve Ha et al.ís RFID privacy model.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Location privacy; Untraceability; RFID protocol; Formal proof model
Date: received 20 Jan 2012
Contact author: sundazhi at tju edu cn
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20120129:044847 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2012/031
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