Paper 2012/031

An error in "On a new formal proof model for RFID location privacy"

Da-Zhi Sun

Abstract

In Information Processing Letters 110 (2) (2009) 57-61, Deursen and Radomirović evaluated five formal RFID privacy models. One main result is that Ha et al.’s RFID privacy model is incorrect. The supporting fact is that a constant-response protocol cannot pass the test of Ha et al.’s RFID privacy model. However, we demonstrate that the constant-response protocol is artificial, and the corresponding result is therefore unwarranted. It means that Ha et al.’s RFID privacy model is not a trivial model. Hence, more effort still can be made to improve Ha et al.’s RFID privacy model.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Location privacyUntraceabilityRFID protocolFormal proof model
Contact author(s)
sundazhi @ tju edu cn
History
2012-01-29: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/031
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/031,
      author = {Da-Zhi Sun},
      title = {An error in "On a new formal proof model for RFID location privacy"},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/031},
      year = {2012},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/031}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/031}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.