Paper 2012/023
On the security of Lo et al.’s ownership transfer protocol
Masoumeh Safkhani, Nasour Bagheri, Majid Naderi, and Ali Mahani
Abstract
Recently Lo et al. have proposed an ownership transfer pro- tocol for RFID objects using lightweight computing operators and claim their protocol provides stronger security robustness and higher perfor- mance efficiency in comparison with existing solutions. However, in this paper we show that their claim unfortunately does not hold. More pre- cisely, we present tag’s secret disclosure attack, new owner’s secret disclo- sure and fraud attack against the Lo et al.’s ownership transfer protocol. The success probability of all attacks is “1” while the complexity is only one run of protocol. Our observation shows that this protocol compro- mise the privacy of the tag and the new owner.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- RFIDOwnership Transfer ProtocolDisclosure AttackFraud Attack.
- Contact author(s)
-
nbagheri @ srttu edu
na bagheri @ gmail com - History
- 2012-02-18: revised
- 2012-01-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/023
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/023,
author = {Masoumeh Safkhani and Nasour Bagheri and Majid Naderi and Ali Mahani},
title = {On the security of Lo et al.’s ownership transfer protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/023},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/023}
}
