Paper 2012/023

On the security of Lo et al.’s ownership transfer protocol

Masoumeh Safkhani, Nasour Bagheri, Majid Naderi, and Ali Mahani

Abstract

Recently Lo et al. have proposed an ownership transfer pro- tocol for RFID objects using lightweight computing operators and claim their protocol provides stronger security robustness and higher perfor- mance efficiency in comparison with existing solutions. However, in this paper we show that their claim unfortunately does not hold. More pre- cisely, we present tag’s secret disclosure attack, new owner’s secret disclo- sure and fraud attack against the Lo et al.’s ownership transfer protocol. The success probability of all attacks is “1” while the complexity is only one run of protocol. Our observation shows that this protocol compro- mise the privacy of the tag and the new owner.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
RFIDOwnership Transfer ProtocolDisclosure AttackFraud Attack.
Contact author(s)
nbagheri @ srttu edu
na bagheri @ gmail com
History
2012-02-18: revised
2012-01-18: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/023
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/023,
      author = {Masoumeh Safkhani and Nasour Bagheri and Majid Naderi and Ali Mahani},
      title = {On the security of Lo et al.’s ownership transfer protocol},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/023},
      year = {2012},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/023}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/023}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.