Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/014
On Indifferentiable Hash Functions in Multi-Stage Security Games
Yusuke Naito and Kazuki Yoneyama and Kazuo Ohta
Abstract: Ristenpart, Shacham, and Shrimpton (EUROCRYPT 2011) demonstrated that for multi-stage security games, composability of indifferentiable hash functions does not sufficiently work.
An open problem from their result is how to obtain multi-stage security when a random oracle (RO) is
replaced with indifferentiable hash functions.
In this paper, we positively solve this problem so that for a large class of public key encryption (PKE) scheme and ID-based encryption (IBE) scheme an important multi-stage security, the CDA security, is obtained even when the RO is replaced with important indifferentiable hash functions, Sponge, Prefix-free Merkle-Damg{\aa}rd, or chop Merkle-Damg{\aa}rd.
Especially, Sponge is employed in the SHA-3 winner Keccak.
First, we introduce a new weakened RO model, called Versatile Oracle ($\vo$) model, as a tool for bridging the multi-stage security and such hash functions.
We prove {\it reset} indifferentiability of these hash functions from a $\vo$; thus, if a cryptosystem is secure in the $\vo$ model, then it is also secure when instantiating the $\vo$ by these hash functions.
Next, we show that if a PKE or IBE scheme satisfies the CPA security in the RO model,
then there exists a CDA secure PKE or IBE scheme in the $\vo$ model.
Combining these two results, we have that for a large class of PKE and IBE schemes the CDA security is guaranteed when the RO is replaced with a large class of practical hash functions.
Category / Keywords: indifferentiability, reset indifferentiability, multi-stage security game
Date: received 9 Jan 2012, last revised 3 Mar 2013
Contact author: Naito Yusuke at ce MitsubishiElectric co jp
Available formats: PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: The paper is updated according to the result of SHA-3 competition.
A result of IBE is added.
Version: 20130304:002612 (All versions of this report)
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