Paper 2012/006

Detecting Dangerous Queries: A New Approach for Chosen Ciphertext Security

Susan Hohenberger, Allison Lewko, and Brent Waters

Abstract

We present a new approach for creating chosen ciphertext secure encryption. The focal point of our work is a new abstraction that we call "Detectable Chosen Ciphertext Security" (DCCA). Intuitively, this notion is meant to capture systems that are not necessarily chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure, but where we can detect whether a certain query CT can be useful for decrypting (or distinguishing) a challenge ciphertext CT*. We show how to build chosen ciphertext secure systems from DCCA security. We motivate our techniques by describing multiple examples of DCCA systems including creating them from 1-bit CCA secure encryption --- capturing the recent Myers-shelat result (FOCS 2009). Our work identifies DCCA as a new target for building CCA secure systems.

Note: Minor typos fixed.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Full version of paper in Eurocrypt 2012.
Keywords
chosen ciphertext securityencryption
Contact author(s)
susan @ cs jhu edu
History
2012-05-16: last of 2 revisions
2012-01-05: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/006
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/006,
      author = {Susan Hohenberger and Allison Lewko and Brent Waters},
      title = {Detecting Dangerous Queries: A New Approach for Chosen Ciphertext Security},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/006},
      year = {2012},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/006}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/006}
}
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