Paper 2011/591

A Unified Framework for Small Secret Exponent Attack on RSA

Noboru Kunihiro, Naoyuki Shinohara, and Tetsuya Izu

Abstract

We address a lattice based method on small secret exponent attack on RSA scheme. Boneh and Durfee reduced the attack into finding small roots of a bivariate modular equation: $x(N+1+y)+1\yen equiv0mode)$, where $N$ is an RSA moduli and $e$ is the RSA public key. Boneh and Durfee proposed a lattice based algorithm for solving the problem. When the secret exponent $d$ is less than $$, their method breaks RSA scheme. Since the lattice used in the analysis is not full-rank, the analysis is not easy. Bl¥"omer and May gave an alternative algorithm. Although their bound $$ is worse than Boneh--Durfee result, their method used a full rank lattice. However, the proof for their bound is still complicated. Herrmann and May gave an elementary proof for the Boneh--Durfee's bound: $$. In this paper, we first give an elementary proof for achieving the bound of Bl¥"omer--May: $$. Our proof employs unravelled linearization technique introduced by Herrmann and May and is rather simpler than Bl¥"omer--May's proof. Then, we provide a unified framework to construct a lattice that are used for solving the problem, which includes two previous method: Herrmann--May and Bl¥"omer--May methods as a special case. Furthermore, we prove that the bound of Boneh--Durfee: $$ is still optimal in our unified framework.