Paper 2011/568
Single Layer Optical-scan Voting with Fully Distributed Trust
Aleksander Essex, Christian Henrich, and Urs Hengartner
Abstract
We present a new approach for cryptographic end-to-end verifiable optical-scan voting. Ours is the first that does not rely on a single point of trust to protect ballot secrecy while simultaneously offering a conventional single layer ballot form and unencrypted paper trail. We present two systems following this approach. The first system uses ballots with randomized confirmation codes and a physical in-person dispute resolution procedure. The second system improves upon the first by offering an informational dispute resolution procedure and a public paper audit trail through the use of self-blanking invisible ink confirmation codes. We then present a security analysis of the improved system.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Full version of paper appearing at the 3rd international conference on E-voting and Identity (VoteID 2011)
- Keywords
- election schemes
- Contact author(s)
- aessex @ cs uwaterloo ca
- History
- 2011-10-22: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/568
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/568,
author = {Aleksander Essex and Christian Henrich and Urs Hengartner},
title = {Single Layer Optical-scan Voting with Fully Distributed Trust},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/568},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/568}
}
