Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2011/506
Towards quantum-resistant cryptosystems from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies
Luca De Feo and David Jao and Jérôme Plût
Abstract: We present new candidates for quantum-resistant public-key
cryptosystems based on the conjectured difficulty of finding isogenies
between supersingular elliptic curves. The main technical idea in our
scheme is that we transmit the images of torsion bases under the isogeny
in order to allow the parties to construct a shared commutative square
despite the noncommutativity of the endomorphism ring. Our work is
motivated by the recent development of a subexponential-time quantum
algorithm for constructing isogenies between ordinary elliptic curves.
In the supersingular case, by contrast, the fastest known quantum attack
remains exponential, since the noncommutativity of the endomorphism ring
means that the approach used in the ordinary case does not apply. We
give a precise formulation of the necessary computational assumptions
along with a discussion of their validity, and prove the
security of our
protocols under these assumptions. In addition, we present implementation
results showing that our protocols are multiple orders of magnitude faster
than previous isogeny-based cryptosystems over ordinary curves.
This paper is an extended version of~\cite{pqcrypto}. We add a new
zero-knowledge identification scheme, and detailed security proofs for
the protocols. We also present a new, asymptotically faster, algorithm
for key generation, a thorough study of its optimization, and new
experimental data.
Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / elliptic curves, isogenies, quantum-resistant cryptosystems
Publication Info: PQCrypto 2011
Date: received 15 Sep 2011, last revised 4 Jul 2012
Contact author: djao at math uwaterloo ca
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: Extended version.
Version: 20120704:152925 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2011/506
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