In this paper, we study the IPS compiler from a number different angles. We present an efficiency improvement of the ``watchlist setup phase'' of the compiler that also facilitates a simpler and tighter analysis of the cheating probability. In addition, we present a conceptually simpler variant that uses protocols that are secure in the presence of covert adversaries as its basic building block. This variant can be used to achieve more efficient asymptotic security, as we show regarding black-box constructions of malicious oblivious transfer from semi-honest oblivious transfer. In addition, it deepens our understanding of the model of security in the presence of covert adversaries. Finally, we analyze the IPS compiler from a \emph{concrete efficiency} perspective and demonstrate that in some cases it can be competitive with the best efficient protocols currently known.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Publication Info: An extended abstract appeared at CRYPTO 2011. This is the full version. Date: received 12 Aug 2011 Contact author: lindell at biu ac il Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20110812:183343 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2011/435 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion