Paper 2011/426
Cryptanalysis of improved Yeh \textit{et al. }'s authentication Protocol: An EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard compliant protocol
Masoumeh Safkhani, Nasour Bagheri, Somitra Kumar Sanadhya, and Majid Naderi
Abstract
EPC class 1 Generation 2(or in short term EPC-C1 G2) is one of the most important standards for RFID passive tags. However, the original protocol known to be insecure. To improve the security of this standard, several protocols have been proposed compliant to this standard. In this paper we analyze the improved Yeh \textit{et al. }'s protocol by Yoon which is conforming to EPC-C1 G2 standard and is one of the most recent proposed protocol in this field. We present several efficient attacks against this protocol. Our first attack is a passive attack that can retrieve all secret parameters of the tag on the cost of eavesdropping only one session of protocol between the tag and a legitimate reader (connected to the back-end database) and
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF PS
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- RFIDEPC-C1 G2Mutual AuthenticationSecret DisclosureTagReader ImpersonationTraceability
- Contact author(s)
- na bagheri @ gmail com
- History
- 2011-08-12: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/426
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/426, author = {Masoumeh Safkhani and Nasour Bagheri and Somitra Kumar Sanadhya and Majid Naderi}, title = {Cryptanalysis of improved Yeh \textit{et al. }'s authentication Protocol: An {EPC} Class-1 Generation-2 standard compliant protocol}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/426}, year = {2011}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/426} }