Paper 2011/425

Thwarting Higher-Order Side Channel Analysis with Additive and Multiplicative Maskings

Laurie Genelle, Emmanuel Prouff, and Michaël Quisquater

Abstract

Higher-order side channel attacks is a class of powerful techniques against cryptographic implementations. Their complexity grows exponentially with the order, but for small orders (e.g. 2 and 3) recent studies have demonstrated that they pose a serious threat in practice. In this context, it is today of great importance to design software countermeasures enabling to counteract higher-order side channel attacks for any arbitrary chosen order. At CHES 2010, Rivain and Prouff have introduced such a countermeasure for the AES. It works for any arbitrary chosen order and benefits from a formal resistance proof. Until now, it was the single one with such assets. By generalizing at any order a countermeasure introduced at ACNS 2010 by Genelle et al. , we propose in this paper an alternative to Rivain and Prouff’s solution. The new scheme can also be proven secure at any order and has the advantage of being at least 2 times more efficient than the existing solutions for orders 2 and 3, while maintaining the RAM consumption lower than 200 bytes.

Note: Extended Version of the paper published at CHES 2011

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Published at CHES 2011
Keywords
Higher-Order Side Channel AnalysisMix of Additive and Multiplicative Masking
Contact author(s)
l genelle @ oberthur com
e prouff @ gmail com
Michael Quisquater @ prism uvsq fr
History
2012-07-26: last of 3 revisions
2011-08-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/425
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/425,
      author = {Laurie Genelle and Emmanuel Prouff and Michaël Quisquater},
      title = {Thwarting Higher-Order Side Channel Analysis with Additive and Multiplicative Maskings},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/425},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/425}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/425}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.