Paper 2011/350

$HB^N$: An HB-like protocol secure against man-in-the-middle attacks

Carl Bosley, Kristiyan Haralambiev, and Antonio Nicolosi

Abstract

We construct a simple authentication protocol whose security is based solely on the problem of Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) which is secure against Man-in-the-Middle attacks. Our protocol is suitable for RFID devices, whose limited circuit size and power constraints rule out the use of more heavyweight operations such as modular exponentiation. The protocol is extremely simple: both parties compute a noisy bilinear function of their inputs. The proof, however, is quite technical, and we believe that some of our technical tools may be of independent interest.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
authenticationsecret-key cryptographyLPNLearning Parity with Noise
Contact author(s)
bosley @ cs stevens edu
History
2011-08-05: revised
2011-07-01: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/350
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/350,
      author = {Carl Bosley and Kristiyan Haralambiev and Antonio Nicolosi},
      title = {$HB^N$: An HB-like protocol secure against man-in-the-middle attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/350},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/350}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/350}
}
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