Paper 2011/344

Efficient Fully Homomorphic Encryption from (Standard) LWE

Zvika Brakerski and Vinod Vaikuntanathan

Abstract

We present a fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is based solely on the (standard) learning with errors (LWE) assumption. Applying known results on LWE, the security of our scheme is based on the worst-case hardness of ``short vector problems'' on arbitrary lattices. Our construction improves on previous works in two aspects: 1. We show that ``somewhat homomorphic'' encryption can be based on LWE, using a new {\em re-linearization} technique. In contrast, all previous schemes relied on complexity assumptions related to ideals in various rings. 2. We deviate from the ``squashing paradigm'' used in all previous works. We introduce a new {\em dimension-modulus reduction} technique, which shortens the ciphertexts and reduces the decryption complexity of our scheme, {\em without introducing additional assumptions}. Our scheme has very short ciphertexts and we therefore use it to construct an asymptotically efficient LWE-based single-server private information retrieval (PIR) protocol. The communication complexity of our protocol (in the public-key model) is $k \cdot \polylog(k)+\log |DB|$ bits per single-bit query (here, $k$ is a security parameter).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
fully homomorphic encryptionlearning with errors
Contact author(s)
vinodv @ alum mit edu
History
2011-08-04: last of 2 revisions
2011-06-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/344
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/344,
      author = {Zvika Brakerski and Vinod Vaikuntanathan},
      title = {Efficient Fully Homomorphic Encryption from (Standard) {LWE}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/344},
      year = {2011},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/344}
}
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