Cryptanalysis of the Smart-Vercauteren and Gentry-Halevi’s Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Gu Chunsheng

Paper 2011/328

Cryptanalysis of the Smart-Vercauteren and Gentry-Halevi’s Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Gu Chunsheng

Abstract

For the fully homomorphic encryption schemes in [SV10, GH11], this paper presents attacks to solve equivalent secret key and directly recover plaintext from ciphertext for lattice dimensions n=2048 by using lattice reduction algorithm. According to the average-case behavior of LLL in [NS06], their schemes are also not secure for n=8192.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: Fully Homomorphic Encryption Cryptanalysis Principal Ideal Lattice Lattice Reduction
Contact author(s): guchunsheng @ gmail com
History: 2012-01-08: revised; 2011-06-22: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2011/328
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/328,
      author = {Gu Chunsheng},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of the Smart-Vercauteren and Gentry-Halevi’s Fully Homomorphic Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/328},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/328}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/328}
}