Paper 2011/255
Hiding the Policy in Cryptographic Access Control
Sascha Müller and Stefan Katzenbeisser
Abstract
Recently, cryptographic access control has received a lot of attention, mainly due to the availability of efficient \emph{Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE)} schemes. ABE allows to get rid of a trusted reference monitor by enforcing access rules in a cryptographic way. However, ABE has a privacy problem: The access policies are sent in clear along with the ciphertexts. Further generalizing the idea of policy-hiding in cryptographic access control, we introduce \emph{policy anonymity} where -- similar to the well-understood concept of $k$-anonymity -- the attacker can only see a large set of possible policies that might have been used to encrypt, but is not able to identify the one that was actually used. We show that using a concept from graph theory we can extend a known ABE construction to achieve the desired privacy property.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. This is the full version of the eponymous paper published at the 7th International Workshop on Security and Trust Management (STM '11)
- Keywords
- access controlprivacytree majorsabeanonymityhidden policies
- Contact author(s)
- mueller @ seceng informatik tu-darmstadt de
- History
- 2011-05-25: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/255
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/255,
author = {Sascha Müller and Stefan Katzenbeisser},
title = {Hiding the Policy in Cryptographic Access Control},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/255},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/255}
}
