Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2011/204
Leakage Tolerant Interactive Protocols
Nir Bitansky and Ran Canetti and Shai Halevi
Abstract: We put forth a framework for expressing security requirements from interactive protocols in the presence of arbitrary leakage. This allows capturing different levels of leakage tolerance of protocols,
namely the preservation (or degradation) of security, under coordinated attacks that include various forms of leakage from the secret states of participating components. The framework extends
the universally composable (UC) security framework. We also prove a variant of the UC theorem, that enables modular design and analysis of protocols even in face of general, non-modular leakage.
We then construct leakage tolerant protocols for basic tasks, such as, secure message transmission, message authentication, commitment, oblivious transfer and zero knowledge. A central component in several of our constructions is the observation that resilience to adaptive party corruptions (in some strong sense) implies leakage-tolerance in an essentially optimal way.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / universal-composition, leakage-resilient-cryptography
Date: received 24 Apr 2011, last revised 28 Apr 2011
Contact author: nirbitan at tau ac il
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20110428:222549 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2011/204
Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion
[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]