Paper 2011/198
Terminating BKZ
Guillaume Hanrot, Xavier Pujol, and Damien Stehlé
Abstract
Strong lattice reduction is the key element for most attacks against lattice-based cryptosystems. Between the strongest but impractical HKZ reduction and the weak but fast LLL reduction, there have been several attempts to find efficient trade-offs. Among them, the BKZ algorithm introduced by Schnorr and Euchner [FCT'91] seems to achieve the best time/quality compromise in practice. However, no reasonable complexity upper bound is known for BKZ, and Gama and Nguyen [Eurocrypt'08] observed experimentally that its practical runtime seems to grow exponentially with the lattice dimension.
In this work, we show that BKZ can be terminated long before its completion, while still providing bases of excellent quality. More precisely, we show that if given as inputs a basis
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Euclidean latticesBKZlattice-based cryptanalysis
- Contact author(s)
- xavier pujol @ ens-lyon fr
- History
- 2011-04-25: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/198
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/198, author = {Guillaume Hanrot and Xavier Pujol and Damien Stehlé}, title = {Terminating {BKZ}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/198}, year = {2011}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/198} }