Paper 2011/194

Cryptanalysis of Chen \textit{et al.}'s RFID Access Control Protocol

Masoumeh Safkhani, Nasour Bagheri, and Majid Naderi

Abstract

Recently Chen \textit{et al.} have proposed a RFID access control protocol based on the strategy of indefinite-index and challenge-response. They have claimed that their protocol provides optimal location privacy and resists against man in the middle, spoofed tag and spoofed reader attacks. However, in this paper we show that Chen \textit{ et al.} protocol does not provide the claimed security. More precisely, we present the following attacks on the protocol: \begin{enumerate} \item Tag impersonation attack. \item Reader impersonation attack. \item Location traceability attack. \end{enumerate} All attacks presented in this paper have the success probability of '1' on the cost of only one or two runs of protocol.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
RFIDAccess ControlSpoofed Reader AttackAuthenticationDesynchronization Attack.
Contact author(s)
nbagheri @ srttu edu
na bagheri @ gmail com
History
2011-04-25: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/194
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/194,
      author = {Masoumeh Safkhani and Nasour Bagheri and Majid Naderi},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of Chen \textit{et al.}'s RFID Access Control Protocol},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/194},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/194}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/194}
}
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