But SIMPLs have a second, perhaps more striking advantage: No secret information is, or needs to be, contained in SIMPL systems in order to enable cryptographic security. Neither in the form of a standard digital key, nor as secret information hidden in the random, analog features of some hardware, as it is the case for PUFs. The security of SIMPL systems instead rests on (i) an assumption regarding their physical unclonability, and (ii) a computational assumption on the complexity of simulating their output. This provides SIMPL systems with a natural immunity against any key extraction attacks, including malware, side channel, invasive, and modeling attempts.
In this manuscript, we give a comprehensive discussion of SIMPLs as a cryptographic and security primitive. Special emphasis is placed on the different cryptographic protocols that are enabled by this new tool.Category / Keywords: Date: received 12 Apr 2011 Contact author: ruehrmair at in tum de Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20110412:194950 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2011/189 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion