Paper 2011/144

Deniable Encryption from the McEliece Assumptions

Bernardo M. David and Anderson C. A. Nascimento

Abstract

The first construction of sender-deniable encryption with negligible detection probability and a single encryption scheme was introduced by Duermuth and Freeman. Their construction is based on samplable public key encryption, which mainly differs from general semantically secure cryptosystems in that it allows the owner of a secret key to extract the randomness used in generating a given ciphertext. However, it was left as an open problem to construct samplable public key encryption based on assumptions other then the hardness of factoring. We show that a semantically secure variant of the McEliece cryptosystem is samplable. Being based on the McEliece assumptions, our scheme is the first not to rely on the hardness of factoring and the first to achieve post quantum security. Our construction takes advantage of specific properties of a semantically secure variant of the McEliece cryptosystem introduced by Nojima et al., which allows us to construct a randomness extraction algorithm.

Metadata
Available format(s)
-- withdrawn --
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Deniable encryption, McEliece assumptions, multi-party computation, electronic voting
Contact author(s)
bernardo david @ redes unb br
History
2011-04-05: withdrawn
2011-03-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/144
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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