Paper 2011/136
A Full Proof of the BGW Protocol for Perfectly-Secure Multiparty Computation
, Bar-Ilan UniversityAbstract
In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of $n$ parties with private inputs wish to jointly compute some functionality of their inputs. One of the most fundamental results of secure computation was presented by Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson (BGW) in 1988. They demonstrated that any $n$-party functionality can be computed with \emph{perfect security}, in the private channels model. When the adversary is semi-honest this holds as long as $t<n/2$ parties are corrupted, and when the adversary is malicious this holds as long as $t<n/3$ parties are corrupted. Unfortunately, a full proof of these results was never published. In this paper, we remedy this situation and provide a full proof of security of the BGW protocol. This includes a full description of the protocol for the malicious setting, including the construction of a new subprotocol for the perfect multiplication protocol that seems necessary for the case of $n/4\leq t<n/3$.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in JOC 2017
- Keywords
- perfect security multiparty computation BGW
- Contact author(s)
-
Gilad Asharov @ biu ac il
Lindell @ biu ac il - History
- 2022-06-12: last of 8 revisions
- 2011-03-21: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/136
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/136,
author = {Gilad Asharov and Yehuda Lindell},
title = {A Full Proof of the {BGW} Protocol for Perfectly-Secure Multiparty Computation},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/136},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/136}
}
