We define and analyze a fourth main type of attack on distance bounding protocols, called Distance Hijacking. This type of attack poses a serious threat in many practical scenarios. We show that many proposed distance bounding protocols are vulnerable to Distance Hijacking, and we propose solutions to make these protocols resilient to this type of attack.
We show that verifying distance bounding protocols using existing informal and formal frameworks does not guarantee the absence of Distance Hijacking attacks. We extend a formal framework for reasoning about distance bounding protocols to include overshadowing attacks. We use the resulting framework to prove the absence of all of the found attacks for protocols to which our countermeasures have been applied.
Previous proposals for distance bounding protocols only analysed their protocols with respect to some specific attack types, whose relations and problem coverage are unknown. To improve this situation, we define an exhaustive classification for attacks on distance bounding protocols.
Category / Keywords: applications / Distance bounding, location verification, position verification, attacks, hijacking, multi-prover environment Publication Info: This is the full version of the IEEE S&P 2012 paper. Date: received 14 Mar 2011, last revised 29 Aug 2012 Contact author: cas cremers at inf ethz ch Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20120829:112033 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2011/129 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion