Paper 2011/112
An efficient certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement scheme from pairings
Debiao He and Jin Hu
Abstract
Key agreement (KA) allows two or more users to negotiate a secret session key among them over an open network. Authenticated key agreement (AKA) is a KA protocol enhanced to prevent active attacks. AKA can be achieved using a public-key infrastructure (PKI) or identity-based cryptography. However, the former suffers from a heavy certificate management burden while the latter is subject to the so-called key escrow problem. Recently, certificateless cryptography was introduced to mitigate these limitations. We propose an efficient certificateless two-party AKA protocol. Security is proven under the standard computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumptions. Our protocol is efficient and practical, because it requires only one pairing operation and three scale multiplications by each party. Moreover, the pairing operation and one scale multiplication scale can be pre-computed, then only two scale multiplications are needed to finished the key agreement.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. The paper has not been published elsewhere.
- Keywords
- Certificateless cryptographyAuthenticated key agreementProvable securityBilinear pairingsElliptic curve
- Contact author(s)
- hedebiao @ 163 com
- History
- 2011-03-10: last of 2 revisions
- 2011-03-06: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/112
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/112,
author = {Debiao He and Jin Hu},
title = {An efficient certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement scheme from pairings},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/112},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/112}
}
