Paper 2011/112

An efficient certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement scheme from pairings

Debiao He and Jin Hu

Abstract

Key agreement (KA) allows two or more users to negotiate a secret session key among them over an open network. Authenticated key agreement (AKA) is a KA protocol enhanced to prevent active attacks. AKA can be achieved using a public-key infrastructure (PKI) or identity-based cryptography. However, the former suffers from a heavy certificate management burden while the latter is subject to the so-called key escrow problem. Recently, certificateless cryptography was introduced to mitigate these limitations. We propose an efficient certificateless two-party AKA protocol. Security is proven under the standard computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumptions. Our protocol is efficient and practical, because it requires only one pairing operation and three scale multiplications by each party. Moreover, the pairing operation and one scale multiplication scale can be pre-computed, then only two scale multiplications are needed to finished the key agreement.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. The paper has not been published elsewhere.
Keywords
Certificateless cryptographyAuthenticated key agreementProvable securityBilinear pairingsElliptic curve
Contact author(s)
hedebiao @ 163 com
History
2011-03-10: last of 2 revisions
2011-03-06: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/112
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/112,
      author = {Debiao He and Jin Hu},
      title = {An efficient certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement scheme from pairings},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/112},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/112}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/112}
}
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