Paper 2011/103

Cryptographically Sound Security Proof for On-Demand Source Routing Protocol EndairA

István Vajda

Abstract

We present the first cryptographically sound security proof of a routing protocol for mobile ad-hoc networks. More precisely, we show that the route discovery protocol does not output a non-existing path under arbitrary active attacks, where on a non-existing path there exists at least one pair of neighboring nodes without communication connection during the run of the route discovery protocol. The proof relies on the Dolev-Yao-style model of Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner, which allows for mapping results obtained symbolically within this model to cryptographically sound proofs if certain assumptions are met.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. cryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
vajda @ hit bme hu
History
2011-03-05: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/103
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/103,
      author = {István Vajda},
      title = {Cryptographically Sound Security Proof for On-Demand Source Routing Protocol EndairA},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/103},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/103}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/103}
}
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