Our definition is carefully formulated to provide one unified framework for a variety of distinct concepts in this area, including arithmetic, homomorphic, quotable, redactable, transitive signatures and more. It includes being unable to distinguish a derived signature from a fresh one even when given the original signature. The inability to link derived signatures to their original sources prevents some practical privacy and linking attacks, which is a challenge not satisfied by most prior works.
Under this strong definition, we then provide generic constructions for all univariate and closed predicates, and specific efficient constructions for a broad class of natural predicates such as quoting, subsets, weighted sums, averages, and Fourier transforms. To our knowledge, these are the first efficient constructions for these predicates (excluding subsets) that provably satisfy this strong security notion.Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / authentication, homomorphic signatures, quoting Publication Info: Full version of paper in TCC 2012. Date: received 24 Feb 2011, last revised 26 Dec 2011 Contact author: susan at cs jhu edu Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20111226:193805 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2011/096 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion