Paper 2011/070

Rational authentication protocols

Long H. Nguyen

Abstract

We use ideas from game theory to transform two families of authentication protocols so that even an intruder attacks a protocol, its payoff will still be lower than when it does not. This is particularly useful in resisting or discouraging a powerful and rational intruder (as present in military applications) who makes many attempts to break a protocol because (1) even the intruder fails, a denial of service attack is still mounted successfully, and (2) in a password-based protocol, the chance of a successful attack increases quite significantly as more and more attempts are launched to guess the password.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. game theory, authentication protocol
Contact author(s)
hiding @ example com
History
2011-02-14: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/070
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/070,
      author = {Long H.  Nguyen},
      title = {Rational authentication protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/070},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/070}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/070}
}
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